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MEDICAL PROVIDER CLAIMS:
STANDING, ASSIGNMENTS, AND ERISA
PREEMPTION
KEVIN WIGGINS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Employee Retirement Income Security of 1974, as
amended ("ERISA") treats participants and beneficiaries
drastically different from how it treats medical providers.
Congress adopted ERISA for the express purpose of protecting the
interests of participants and beneficiaries in their employee
benefit plans.1 As it has turned out, ERISA claimants are often
required to pay for mistakes made by plan administrators when
communicating a plan's terms or conditions. Often, medical
providers do not have this same problem.
ERISA increases participants' risks with a combination of its
preemptive force and its limited remedial scheme. ERISA
preempts state law causes of action that could otherwise provide
participants with relief. It goes on to limit considerably the
remedies that are available under ERISA, sometimes to nothing:
no remedy whatsoever. In contrast, medical providers are
permitted to pursue state law causes of actions and seek whatever
remedies may be available under state law. The following
hypothetical illustrates the difference.
An executive employee wakes one morning to find her
husband deathly ill. He is rushed to a hospital. There, the doctors
developed an experimental surgical procedure that could save his
life. They expect he will die unless they perform the operation in
the next two hours. Stricken with grief, the executive calls her
employer.
She asks if the employer's health plan (the "Plan"), which is
covered by ERISA, covers the experimental procedure. Not
realizing the Plan excludes experimental procedures, the Director
of Human Resources tells her the Plan will cover the operation.
"Have your husband get the operation. The Plan covers it." The
executive hangs up and signs the hospital paperwork, which
includes a valid assignment of her husband's Plan benefits.
* Attorney, Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, LLP; Member, ERISA Advisory
Council, 2008-10.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006).
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Thirty minutes later, as a result of the same illness, the
executive collapses and becomes incapacitated. The hospital
contacts her father, who holds a medical power of attorney for his
daughter. He authorizes the executive's operation, but he cannot
pay for it.
The hospital tracks downs the executive's employer and
reaches the Vice President ("VP") of Employee Benefits. The VP
makes the same mistake the HR Director made, and tells the
hospital the Plan covers the procedure. "Go ahead and perform the
operation," the VP says. "The Plan covers it." The hospital never
discusses the husband's operation with the VP or any other agent
of the Plan or the employer. Other than the HR Director, who
spoke only with the executive, no one at the employer knows the
executive's husband is in the hospital.
The hospital performs both operations. The executive and her
husband survive and recover from the illness.
The hospital submits both bills to the Plan. Both are denied
on the grounds that the Plan does not cover experimental
procedures. The husband and wife properly exhaust their
administrative remedies under ERISA, but both claims are denied
on final appeal and by the independent review organization.
The executive, her husband, and the hospital all sue the Plan
and the employer. For each operation, the hospital files state law
claims in its individual capacity for breach of contract and
negligent misrepresentation. It also files the same state law claims
as an assignee of the executive and her husband, as well as a claim
for benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA. For their part, the
executive and her husband file state law claims for breach of
contract and negligent misrepresentation, and a claim under
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). 2 Ultimately, the hospital recovers on its
claim for the executive's surgery, but not for her husband's
surgery. The husband fails to recover anything. The executive and
her husband must pay for the husband's operation out-of-pocket.
Under ERISA case law, this hypothetical could be a reality.
The courts have made it clear that rarely will an oral promise to a
plan participant or beneficiary that purports to modify the terms
of the written plan be enforceable. Any state law claim based on
that promise will be preempted by ERISA. Any claim brought
under ERISA will, absent extraordinary circumstances, generally
fail. In contrast, that same oral promise to a medical provider can
be enforced through a state law claim.
This Article analyzes how the courts distinguish between

2. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006). Assume the parties do not pursue a
claim under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), or any other state law
claims.
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promises made to a medical provider and promises made to
participants or beneficiaries. The rule is that ERISA preempts a
claim only when it affects the relationships among traditional
ERISA entities-the employer, the plan and its fiduciaries, and
the participants and beneficiaries. That is like saying ERISA
promises can be broken because ERISA was enacted to protect
participants.3 Unfortunately, the issues are not that simple.
As relevant here, ERISA regulates health care benefits
provided by private employers. As a nation we have learned, since
at least July 30, 1965,4 until President Obama adopted the
Affordable Care Act,5 that the delivery and financing of health
care is not easy. As with many things, one of the difficult aspects
of administering the two is achieving a system of effective
communications. When communications break down-when there
is a misstatement or an unintentional misrepresentation about the
existence or extent of plan coverage-disputes can arise. By
distinguishing between participants and medical providers, the
courts have construed ERISA as establishing a framework for
determining, when disputes arise, (1) which party should bear the
risk of misstatements and misrepresentations and (2) what
standard of care a plan must breach before it bears responsibility
for its errors.
There may be legitimate reasons for subjecting medical
providers and participants to different levels of risk. Medical
providers may not have the same access to plan information that
Congress affords participants. For example, if a participant is
unsure about whether a procedure is covered, he may request a
copy of the plan document. 6 Medical providers may not have this
option. If the issue is important enough, a participant can ask a
court to clarify her rights under the plan.7 Of course, a participant
3. See ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (stating that "[ilt is hereby
declared to be the policy of [ERISA] to protect ... the interest of participants
in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries .... "). The author does not
intend to accuse any court of improper motives. The author believes that,
except for extremely rare cases where judges engage in intentional misconduct
(such as accepting bribes), courts in all cases do what they believe is the right
thing. It should also be noted that Congress expressly designed ERISA to
protect the "interests" of participants in their benefits plans. Participants
could be said to have an interest in their employer forming and maintaining
employee benefit plans. Infra notes 193 and 196 and accompanying text.
4. President Johnson ushered in Medicare when, on July 30, 1965, he
enacted the Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat.
286 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
5. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (to be
codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
6. ERISA § 104(b)(4), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1024(b)(4) (2008).
7. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
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should not have to file a federal lawsuit to be assured a plan will
be held to its promises.
One alternative is to have the employer direct the promise to
the medical provider. In such a case, the promise could be
enforceable under state law. This seems like a trap for the unwary.
It could also be perceived as "unfair," as if the courts are quick to
preempt an employee's state law claim but gladly allow a
commercial enterprise to pursue the same claim under almost
identical circumstances. Regardless of the reasons, the case law is
clear. Oral promises to participants that are contrary to the plan's
terms are generally not enforceable absent extraordinary
circumstances, whereas promises to medical providers are not only
enforceable, but could also lead to mandatory attorneys' fees or
extra-contractual damages, depending on which state law applies.
This Article also reviews relevant doctrines that could impact
whether a medical provider's claim would be viable. Part II of this
Article reviews ERISA preemption. Part III examines the
exclusive vehicles for civil enforcement of ERISA under § 502(a). 8
Part IV reviews the limits to remedies that are available under
ERISA. Part V evaluates whether medical providers have standing
to bring a claim for relief under ERISA. The standing analysis
extends to Article III standing, statutory standing under ERISA
§ 502(a), and derivative standing as an assignee of a claim. Part VI
surveys cases finding that state law claims brought by medical
providers are not completely preempted by ERISA. Part VII
concludes.
II.

A PRIMER ON ERISA PREEMPTION

A. Brief Summary of FederalPreemption
"The Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, may entail
preemption of state law . .. by express provision, by implication, or
by a conflict between federal and state law."9 Under express
preemption, "Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its
enactments pre-empt state law."1o "[I]n the absence of explicit
statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates
conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government
to occupy exclusively."" "Finally, state law is pre-empted to the
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
9. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
8.

Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995) (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Res. Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) and Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)).
10. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990) (citing Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-98 (1983)).
11. Id. at 79; Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
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extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Thus, the Court
has found pre-emption where it is impossible for a private party to
comply with both state and federal requirements or where state
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 12 Whether a federal
law preempts state law turns on congressional intent.1 3
"[W]here federal law is said to bar state action in fields of
traditional state regulation," the Court assumes "that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress."1 4 "Thus, when the text of a pre-emption clause is
susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily
'accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption."'1 "[A]n
assumption of nonpre-emption is not triggered," however, "when
the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of
significant federal presence." 16

B. ERISA's Express Preemption
ERISA § 514(a) provides that "the provisions of [Titles I and
IV of ERISA] shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan. . . ."1 7 "The term 'State law' includes all laws, decisions,
rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of
any State" (including the District of Columbia). 18 With § 514,
Congress intended "to establish the regulation of employee welfare
benefits plans 'as exclusively a federal concern."'19
ERISA § 514(b) carves out certain state laws from the reach
of ERISA preemption. As relevant here, those include state laws
regulating
insurance,
banking,
or
securities. 20
Under
§ 514(b)(2)(B)-known as the deemer clause-an employer's selfinsured plan cannot be considered an insurance company subject
to a state's insurance laws. 21 Congress also carved out generally

141, 153 (1982).
12. English, 496 U.S. at 79 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
13. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
14. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
15. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (quoting Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)).
16. U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
18. ERISA § 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1).
19. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656 (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)).
20. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41, 47 (1987) ([T]o summarize the pure mechanics of [ERISA § 514(a) and
(b)(2)]: If a state law "relate[s] to ... employee benefit plan[s]," it is preempted. § 514(a). The saving clause excepts from the pre-emption clause laws
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applicable criminal laws of the states from the pre-emptive force of
ERISA. 22
Early in its jurisprudence of ERISA preemption, the Court
interpreted ERISA preemption very broadly, holding that "a law
'relates to' an employee benefit plan. . . if it has a connection with
or reference to such a plan."23 Since then, the Court has struggled
with the scope of ERISA's "relate-to" preemption. In some cases,
the Court "observed repeatedly that this broadly worded provision
is 'clearly expansive."' 24 At the same time, the Court "recognized
that the term 'relate to' cannot be taken 'to extend to the furthest
stretch of its indeterminacy,' or else 'for all practical purposes preemption would never run its course."'25 "Some state actions may
affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral
a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan." 26
Justice Scalia once remarked that the Court's application of
ERISA's "relate to" provision "was a project doomed to failure,
since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is
related to everything else." 27
To overcome the difficulty of determining when a state law
"relates to" an employee benefit plan, the Court decided to "go
beyond the unhelpful text and frustrating difficulty of defining its
key term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute
as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood
would survive." 28 Using this analysis, the Court held that § 514
preempts at least three categories of state law: (1) laws that
mandate employee benefit structures or their administration, (2)
laws that bind employers or plan administrators to particular
choices or preclude uniform administrative practices, and (3) laws
that provide alternative enforcement mechanisms to ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions. 29
In one of the earlier cases involving preemption of a state law
cause of action, the Court held that ERISA preempts state
common law tort and contract actions asserting improper
that "regulat[e] insurance." § 514(b)(2)(A). The deemer clause makes clear that
a state law that "purport[s] to regulate insurance" cannot deem an employee
benefit plan to be an insurance company. § 514(b)(2)(B).).
22. ERISA § 514(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4).
23. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97 (1983).
24. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex. rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (quoting
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655).
25. Id.
26. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21; Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-62.
27. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A.,
Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656.
29. Id. at 658-60; Trs. of AFTRA Health Fund v. Biondi, 303 F.3d 765, 775
(7th Cir. 2002).
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processing of a claim for benefits.30 Following Pilot Life, the courts
have found a host of state law claims founded on an employer's
misrepresentations or misstatements preempted by ERISA.31
In Franklin v. QHG of Gadsen, Inc.,32 the employee's husband
was confined to a 24-hour nursing care home due to his illness.
The expenses were covered by the plan sponsored by her employer,
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company. She received an offer to work
at Baptist Memorial Hospital, but she wanted her husband's
expenses for nursing care covered. Baptist Memorial provided her
assurances that the expenses would be covered, and she accepted
its offer. Afterward, Baptist Memorial reduced the benefits. She
sued alleging, among other things, misrepresentation. The
Eleventh Circuit had little trouble finding her state law claims
related to an employee benefit plan and were therefore
preempted. 33 The court dismissed Franklin's argument that she
had an independent agreement: "the written terms of a medical
welfare plan cannot be modified by oral [or 'separate and distinct']
agreements,' the 'alleged misrepresentation relates directly to
[the] medical benefits plan,' and plaintiffs state law claims are
preempted." 34
In a second case, Tart v. IMV Energy Systems of America,
Inc.,35 the plaintiff agreed to work for the defendant only after the
defendant promised that its health plan would cover fertility
treatments. General Electric purchased Tart's employer one year
after Tart's date of hire and amended the plan to eliminate the
promised benefits. Relying on Franklin, and rejecting the
plaintiffs argument that he had an independent agreement, the
district court held the plaintiffs state law claims for

30. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 41.
31. See, e.g., Carlo v. Reed Rolled Thread Die Co., 49 F.3d 790 (1st Cir.
1995); Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1989); Lister v. Stark,
890 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1989); Smith v. Dunham-Bush, Inc., 959 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.
1992); Pohl v. Nat'l Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1992);
Muse v. IBM, 103 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 1996); Griggs v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours
& Co., 237 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2001); Reliable Home Health Care, Inc. v. Union
Cent. Ins. Co., 295 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 2002); Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953
F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1992); Elmore v. Cone Mills Corp., 23 F.3d 855 (4th Cir.
1994); Nester v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d 901 (S.D. Ohio
2001); see generally Paul J. Ondrasik, Jr. and Leslie R. Hoffman, The
Inconsistent Oral Promise and Related Problems, ERISA Litigation Conference
- 15th Annual, ELC GLASS-CLE 296, Glasser Legalworks (2002) (discussing
ERISA preemption of state law claims based on employers' misrepresentations
or misstatements).
32. Franklin v. QHG of Gadsden, Inc., 127 F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 1997).
33. Id. at 1028-29.
34. Tart v. IMV Energy Sys. of Am., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1180-81
(N.D. Ga. 2005) (quoting Franklin, 127 F.3d at 1029).
35. Tart, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 1172.
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misrepresentation were preempted by ERISA.36
As the foregoing cases indicate, an employee's state law claim
based on broken promises, misstatements, and misrepresentations
are preempted by ERISA. It does not help an employee to claim
that a separate agreement existed with the employer. Any such
claim is preempted. This form of preemption is sometimes referred
to as "defensive" preemption, because it is considered an
affirmative defense that can be pled, or waived, in both state and
federal courts. 37
C. ERISA Conflict Preemption
ERISA preempts a state law if it "conflicts with the provisions
of ERISA or operates to frustrate its objectives." 38 When it does,
there is no need to determine whether ERISA's "relate to"
provision preempts the state law.39 In Boggs, the Court held
ERISA preempts a Louisiana law that would permit a nonparticipant spouse to transfer an interest in undistributed pension
benefits through her will.40 The United States District Court for
the Northern District of West Virginia held a West Virginia
statute that would extinguish the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation lien on a warehouse sold in a tax sale was preempted
because it conflicts with ERISA § 4068, 29 U.S.C. § 1368.41
D. FieldPreemption
The clearest example of ERISA field preemption is the
doctrine of complete preemption. 42 Complete preemption is a

36. Id.; see also Ellenburg v. Parkway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1985).
37. Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 349-50 (2d Cir. 2003);

Bertoni v. Stock Bldg. Supply, 989 So. 2d 670, 674 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
38. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997).
39. Id.
40. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 844-54; Branco v. UFCW-N. Cal. Emp'rs Joint
Pension Plan, 279 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2002).
41. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Boury, Inc., No. 5:02-CV-161, 2009 WL
3334924 (N.D. W.Va. October 14, 2009) (unpublished), available at
http://scholar.google.com/scholarcase?case=8159676710432161345&q=Pensio
n+Benefit+Guaranty+Corp.+v.+Boury,+Inc&hl=en&assdt=2,14.
42. As the Court noted, the different categories of preemption are not
"rigidly distinct." "Indeed, field preemption may be understood as a species of
conflict preemption." English, 496 U.S. at 79 n,5. For example, in some
instances courts have suggested that ERISA's express "relate to" preemption
and conflict preemption may be the same. Ellis v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of
Boston, 394 F.3d 262, 275-76 (5th Cir. 2004). However, the court may have
been alluding to § 514 as an "express conflict provision." David P. Coldesina,
D.D.S. v. Estate of Simper, 407 F.3d 1126, 1136 (10th Cir. 2005); Van Natta v.
Sara Lee Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 911, 924 n.4 (N.D. Iowa 2006). In placing
ERISA complete preemption under the rubric of field preemption, this Article
follows the lead of the Court. Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355,
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jurisdictional doctrine. In contrast to "defensive preemption,"
which does not provide a basis for federal jurisdiction, complete
preemption empowers a federal court with jurisdiction over what
would otherwise be a state law claim. Complete preemption is
often an issue when a defendant removes a state law claim for
43
benefits to federal court.
A civil action filed in state court may be removed to federal
court if the claim "arises under" federal law.44 As a general rule,
claims based on state law do not arise under federal law and thus
are not removable. To determine whether an action arises under
federal law, the courts rely on the well-pleaded complaint rule.
Under that rule, courts "examine the 'well pleaded' allegations of
the complaint and ignore potential defenses."45 "As a general rule,
absent diversity jurisdiction, a case will not be removable if the
46
complaint does not affirmatively allege a federal claim."
One exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule arises when
the preemptive force of a federal law "is so powerful as to displace
entirely any state cause of action . . . ."47 In such a case, a
complaint may be removed even if the complaint alleges only state
4
causes of actions. For example, in Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 8 the
Court held that an employer's state law claim to enjoin a strike as
a violation of the "no-strike" clause under the collective bargaining
agreement was removable under § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act.4 9 Similarly, in Metropolitan Life, the Court held
that, due in part to ERISA's civil enforcement scheme at § 502(a),
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), ERISA completely preempts a state law cause
of action asserting improper processing of benefit claims under a
50
plan covered by ERISA.
At least two consequences stem from a court's finding that a
state law claim is completely preempted. First, complete

378 (2002) (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64 (1987)).
43. A claim for plan benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B), may be brought in state court or federal court because state
and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction. ERISA § 502(e), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(e). Provided that the other requirements of removal are satisfied, a §
502(a)(1)(B) claim can be removed because the action arises under federal law.
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
45. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003).
46. Id.
47. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64 (1987) (quoting Franchise
Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 2324 (1983)).
48. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006).
50. Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 64. See infra notes 65-70 for a more detailed
discussion of ERISA's civil enforcement scheme under ERISA § 502(a), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a).
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preemption serves as the basis for removal of a state law claim. 51
Second, complete preemption "convert[s] an ordinary state
common law complaint into one stating a federal claim."5 2 Prior to
Aetna v. Davila,53 to be completely preempted, a claim was
required both (1) to relate to an employee benefit plan and (2) fall
within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions set forth
in ERISA § 502(a).5 4
Davila clarified the analysis of complete preemption under
ERISA. It rose in the context of managed care litigation and
involved numerous claimants consolidated into one case. To
illustrate one claim, the claimant's treating physician
recommended an extended hospital stay after her surgery. The
managed care organization that administered her employer's
health plan, CIGNA, denied coverage for the stay. Later, she
experienced postsurgery complications that she alleged were
caused by CIGNA's failure to authorize her extended hospital
stay.5 5
Seeking tort damages,5 6 she sued CIGNA in Texas state court
under the Texas Health Care Liability Act ("THCLA")57 alleging
CIGNA violated its duty of care. CIGNA removed the case to
federal court and the claimant filed a motion to remand. The
District Court held the claim was completely preempted by ERISA
and denied the motion.5 8 All of the claimants involved in the case
refused to amend their complaints to include an ERISA claim and
appealed the denial of the motion to remand.59 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the
claims were not completely preempted, and CIGNA appealed to
the Supreme Court.
Relying on Pilot Life, the Court held that "any state-law cause
of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA
civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional
intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore pre51. See, e.g., Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic
States, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1137, 1144 (E.D. Va. 1997) (stating that "[i]t is
important to recognize that the jurisdictional doctrine of complete preemption
differs from the federal defense of ERISA preemption. Only the former, not the
latter, is a basis for removal.") (footnote omitted).
52. Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1165 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Metro.
Life, 481 U.S. at 64).
53. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
54. Marks v. Watters, 322 F. 3d 316, 323 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Metro. Life,
481 U.S. at 66-67).
55. Davila, 542 U.S. at 204-05.
56. Id. at 214.
57. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. §§ 88-001-88.003 (West 2004 Supp.
Pamphlet).
58. Davila, 542 U.S. at 205.

59. Id.
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empted."6 0 The Court went on to hold that under the complete
preemption doctrine, "causes of action within the scope of the civil
enforcement provisions of § 502(a) [are] removable to federal
court."6 1
Next the Court held that the claimant's THCLA cause of
action was within the scope of ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B):
[I]f an individual brings suit complaining of a denial of coverage for
medical care, where the individual is entitled to such coverage only
because of the terms of an ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan,
and where no legal duty (state or federal) independent of ERISA or
the plan terms is violated, then the suit falls "within the scope of'
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). In other words, if an individual, at some point
in time, could have brought his claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B),
and where there is no other independent legal duty that is
implicated by a defendant's actions, then the individual's cause of
62
action is completely pre-empted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).
The Court found that the THCLA did not establish an
"independent legal duty" because the managed care organization's
duties would be triggered only if the plan's terms covered the
denied treatment. If the plan did not cover the treatment, then the
63
managed care entity could not be held liable for the denial.
Courts have construed Davila to require that a claim must
satisfy three elements to be completely preempted by ERISA.
First, the claim must fall within the scope of the civil enforcement
provisions of ERISA § 502(a). 64 Second, the plaintiff must have
standing to bring a suit under ERISA. 65 Third, ERISA does not
completely preempt a claim if the claim implicates a duty that is
independent of ERISA.66
The first element required for complete preemption is the
claim must fall within the civil enforcement provisions in § 502(a)
of ERISA.67 Those enforcement provisions play a pivotal role in
ERISA litigation.
III. ERISA's CIVIL ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
In Pilot Life, the Court observed that the civil enforcement
provisions of ERISA § 502(a) are the exclusive vehicle for actions
by ERISA plan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
2011).
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 209.
Id. (quoting Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 66).
Id. at 210 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 212-13.
Ehlen Floor Covering, Inc. v. Lamb, 660 F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (11th Cir.
Id.
Id.
29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a) (West 2009).
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processing of a claim for benefits.6 8 In other words, any actions
based on ERISA must be brought under one of the provisions in
§ 502(a). The provisions that are relevant here are ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3).6 9
Under § 502(a)(1)(B), a participant or beneficiary may only be
awarded benefits that are due under the terms of the plan. 70 A
participant or beneficiary may also bring an action under
§ 502(a)(1)(B) to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan or
to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.
ERISA § 502(a)(3) permits a participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary to bring a civil action to enjoin any action that violates
ERISA or the terms of the plan.7 1 In addition, an action may be
brought to redress a violation of ERISA, or to enforce any
provision of ERISA or the terms of the plan, but the relief under
§ 502(a)(3) is limited to "appropriate equitable relief."72
These two provisions of ERISA, §§ 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3),
are generally the only cause of actions that would be available to a
participant injured by a plan's misstatement or misrepresentation.
And, as the exclusive vehicle for ERISA actions, these sections
limit the ERISA remedies that are available to a participant or
beneficiary.
A.

ERISA Remedies

There are a considerable number of cases and articles that
discuss ERISA's limited remedies.73 Accordingly, this Article will

68. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 53.
69. The remedies that are available under ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C
§ 1132(a)(2), are limited to the relief provided under ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1109. Under that section, generally, a fiduciary can be held personally liable
for losses to the plan resulting from, or a disgorgement of profits realized by a
use of plan assets in, a breach of ERISA fiduciary duties. Relief under § 409
can only be imposed on ERISA fiduciaries, and the recovery must inure to the
benefit of the plan. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140-48
(1985). See also LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248 (2008).
This Article will not address remedies that run in favor of the plan, and thus
will not cover ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
70. See, e.g., Clair v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 190 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir.
1999) (stating that "only benefits specified in the plan can be recovered in a
suit under section 502(a)(1)(B)").
71. ERISA § 502(a)(3)(A); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3)(A).
72. ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3)(B).
73. See, e.g., Dana Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional
Compromise?, 81 IOwA L. REV. 1 (1995); Andrew Stumpff, Darkness at Noon:
Judicial Interpretation May Have Made Things Worse for Benefit Plan
ParticipantsUnder ERISA Than Had the Statute Never Been Enacted, 23 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 221, 233-36 (2011); Peter K. Stris, ERISA Remedies, Welfare
Benefits, and Bad Faith: Losing Sight of the Cathedral,26 Hofstra. LAB. &
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provide only a brief review.
The available remedies under §§ 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3)
are generally limited to benefits due under the terms of the plan,
an injunction, or other appropriate equitable relief. Notably,
ERISA does not authorize an award of extra-contractual
compensatory, or punitive damages for the improper or untimely
processing of benefit claims.7 4 Moreover, § 502(a)(3) does not
authorize monetary damages, but instead limits relief to
"appropriate equitable relief."75
Appropriate equitable relief is relief that was "typically
available in equity."76 This includes equitable remedies such as an
"injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory
damages."77 Recently, the Court may have broadened the generally
accepted concepts of what relief may be available under
§ 502(a)(3), but absent an amendment to ERISA, it is doubtful that
extra-contractual or punitive damages will ever be available under
ERISA § 502(a)(3).7 8
Generally, no relief is available under § 502(a)(3) where
Congress provided for adequate relief in another provision of
ERISA.79 Thus, where a participant is eligible for relief under
§ 502(a)(1)(B), he is not permitted to bring a simultaneous claim
under ERISA § 502(a)(3) that in essence is a disguised benefit
claim.8 0 However, if the two claims allege different injuries, both
may be pursued.8 1
Most circuits have allowed ERISA claimants to proceed under
the doctrine of equitable estoppel.8 2 To succeed on an estoppel
claim, plaintiffs must usually, depending on the court,
EMP. L.J. 387 (2009).
74. Russell, 473 U.S. at 148.
75. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993); Great-West Life &
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); Todisco v. Verizon
Commc'ns, Inc., 497 F.3d 95, 99 (1st Cir. 2007).
76. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.
77. Id.
78. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011). Other forms of relief
that might be available in connection with ERISA litigation include, but are
not limited to, attorneys' fees (though attorneys' fees are discretionary),
prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest, and "ill-gotten" plan assets or
profits. ERISA § 502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g); Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1030 (4th Cir. 1993); Harris Trust and Say. Bank v.
Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 247-53 (2000).
79. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996).
80. Mondry v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 557 F.3d 781, 805 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citing Korotynska v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 474 F.3d 101, 106 (4th Cir. 2006)).
81. See Gore v. El Paso Energy Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 477 F.3d
833, 839-40 (6th Cir. 2007); Hill v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich., 409
F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2005).
82. See, e.g., Mello v. Sara Lee Corp., 431 F.3d 440, 444-47 (5th Cir. 2005);
Robert E. Hoskins, Equitable Estoppel as a Remedy Under ERISA, 56 S.D. L.
REV. 456 (2011).
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demonstrate similar (though not always identical) elements: (1) a
material misrepresentation in writing, (2) reasonable and
detrimental reliance, and (3) extraordinary circumstances. 83
"Principles of estoppel, however, cannot be applied to vary the
terms of unambiguous plan documents; estoppel can only be
invoked in the context of ambiguous plan provisions." 84 Indeed, the
"Supreme Court, followed by several courts of appeals, has
indicated that a modification that purports to vest welfare benefits
must be contained in the plan documents and must be stated in
clear and express language." 85
If an oral misrepresentation is made by a plan fiduciary and
the statement arises to the level of a breach of fiduciary duties,
then a participant might have a claim under ERISA § 502(a)(3).8 6
For example, in Varity, the employer intentionally misled plan
participants about their future benefits to induce them to agree to
transfer to a newly established company that the employer
reasonably knew would fail.87 The Court found this to be a breach
of fiduciary duty that was actionable under § 502(a)(3) and
affirmed the remedy of reinstatement to the employer's old plan.88
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Frahm distinguishes
between the course of conduct found in Varity and mere "bad
advice delivered verbally."89 There, the retiree plaintiffs alleged
their employer made oral representations about their retirement
benefits, but later breached those representations when it raised
the retiree's cost of medical benefits.9 0 The retirees argued that
these representations were actionable pursuant to Varity. The
Seventh Circuit found the employer in Varity engaged in a
"campaign of disinformation that led employees to surrender their
benefits."91 The court rejected the notion that ERISA § 404(a),92
83. Mello, 431 F.3d at 444-45; Hoskins, supra note 82, at 471-73.
84. Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 404 (6th Cir. 1998).
85. Vallone v. CNA Fin. Corp., 375 F.3d 623, 632 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing
Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520
U.S. 510, 515 (1997)); see also Frahm v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 137
F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 1998), in which the court stated:
Although ... a written plan may be combined with an oral promise, ....
the utility of reducing retirement promises to writing and avoiding
arguments about who said what to whom are so fundamental to both
ERISA and contract law that an extension of the writing requirement to
all long-term commitments is an inescapable ingredient of the federal
common law slowly accumulating in ERISA's shadow.
86. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996); Adams v. Freedom Forge
Corp., 204 F.3d 475 (3d Cir. 2000).
87. Varity, 516 U.S. at 506-15.

88. Id.
89. Frahm, 137 F.3d at 961.
90. Frahm, 137 F.3d at 956-57.
91. Id. at 959.
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the statute that establishes ERISA's fiduciary standards, "is a
guarantor of accurate information at all times."93 The court of
appeals said "[tlreating [ERISA § 404(a)] as establishing a duty to
give plan participants whatever benefits someone on the staff led
them to believe were available would undermine an essential
principle established by ERISA: there are no oral variances from
written plans."94
The limited remedies that are available under ERISA appear
to be a strong motivating factor in disputes over whether a claim is
preempted by ERISA. The potential to be awarded extracontractual damages, punitive damages, or even mandatory
attorneys' fees in state court, combined with the absence of such
remedies under ERISA, gives plaintiffs an incentive to pursue
state law claims. Another factor could be the deferential standard
of review afforded to plan fiduciaries that have discretion to
interpret a plan.95 A third factor is that medical service providers
may not have standing to pursue a claim under ERISA.
B. Standing
When state law remedies are not available because of ERISA
preemption, standing can be critical. If the state law claims are
preempted, then the only remedies a plaintiff may seek are those
that are available under ERISA. But, as noted above, the only
avenues available for ERISA are the exclusive civil enforcement
vehicles set forth in ERISA § 502(a). Thus, if a plaintiffs state law
claims are preempted, and the plaintiff has no standing to pursue
a claim under § 502(a), the plaintiff will be left with no relief to
pursue.96
There are at least three ways a medical provider could lack
standing to bring an ERISA claim. First, the provider may not
have standing under Article III of the Constitution. Second, a
provider may not have direct, statutory standing under § 502(a) of
ERISA. Third, the provider may not have standing to bring a claim
as an assignee-known as derivative standing-if the assignment
is not valid.9 7 Each is discussed below.

92. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a) (West 2008).
93. Frahm, 137 F.3d at 958-59.
94. Id. at 960.
95. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
96. See Felix v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 387 F.3d 1146, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that "our opinion leaves open the uncomfortable possibility that
Plaintiffs may lack standing to sue under ERISA, but will then be preempted
in state court under § 514 from asserting a state claim, leaving them with no
remedy.").
97. In some cases, a medical service provider might not be a real party in
interest under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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1. Article III Standing to PursueAssigned Claims; in General
At common law, not all claims were assignable. For example,
"[u]nder the common law and the law of most states, personal
injuries claims are not assignable absent a statute to the
contrary."98 In contrast, the Court today recognizes that "an
assignee of a legal claim for money owed has standing to pursue
that claim in federal court."9 9
In Sprint, payphone operators ("operators") assigned their
claims for payment from long distance communications carriers
AT&T) ("carrier") to aggregators
as Sprint or
(such
("aggregators").oo The aggregators would sue the carrier on behalf
of the operators, remit any recovery to the operators, and receive a
fee for this service. The carriers asserted the aggregators had no
standing, and this argument reached the Supreme Court. 101
To have standing under Article 111:102
[A] plaintiff must adequately establish: (1) an injury in fact (i.e., a
"concrete and particularized' invasion of a "legally protected
interest"); (2) causation (i.e., a "fairly ... trace[able]" connection
between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the
defendant); and (3) redressability (i.e., it is "likely" and not "merely
speculative" that the plaintiffs injury will be remedied by the relief
plaintiff seeks in bringing suit).103
The Court found the aggregators satisfied all of these
requirements.
The operators' injury sufficiently established an injury in fact
because "an assignee can sue based on his assignor's injuries."104
As for redressability, the inquiry focuses on whether the injury "is
likely to be redressed through the litigation." 0 5 The majority
opinion defines the "injury" as the carrier's failure to pay106 and
07
the failure, by somebody-or anybody-"to receive" payment.
The requisite injury, the majority appears to imply, had nothing to
do with whether the operators received payment. Because
98. Lexington Ins. Co. v. S.H.R.M. Catering Serv., Inc., 567 F.3d 182, 185
(5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted).
99. Sprint Commc'ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 271
(2008).
100. Id. at 271-72.
101. Id. at 272-73.
102. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
103. Sprint Commc'ns, 554 U.S. at 273-74 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)) (punctuation omitted).
104. Id. at 286 (citing Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000)).
105. Id. at 287.
106. Id. at 273.
107. Id. at 287. The Court had no problem assuming the carriers caused
that injury. See id. at 274 (stating that "[t]he 'carriers' caused that injury").
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successful litigation by the aggregators would result in the carriers
writing somebody a check-even if to the aggregators and not to
the operators-the injury, as defined by the majority opinion,
could be redressed through the litigation. 0 8
2. Article III Standingas Assignee of an ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)
Claim
No court has addressed how Sprint might impact the
assignment of a claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) to a medical
service provider,109 but Sprint should not have much impact. It
seems a medical provider would easily satisfy Sprint's three
requirements for Article III standing: injury, causation, and
redressability. A medical provider's claim would satisfy the
requirements for redressability even under the standard
articulated by Chief Justice Roberts in his dissent in Sprint.
There, Chief Justice Roberts argues, inter alia, that redressability
concerns whether the complaining party's injury-that the
operators did not receive payment-can be redressed by the
litigation.110 "We have never approved federal-court jurisdiction
over a claim where the entire relief requested will run to a party
not before the court.""' Because a medical provider seeks to
redress its own injury before the court, even under the dissent's
standard a medical provider would have Article III standing to
pursue an assigned § 502(a)(1)(B) claim. There could, however, be
some circumstances where an assignee of a § 502(a)(3) claim may
not have Article III standing because the claim would not satisfy
Sprint's requirement for redressability.
3. Article III Standing as Assignee of an ERISA § 502(a)(3) Claim
Although no court has held that claims under § 502(a)(3) are
assignable for standing purposes, some courts may have implied
they are.112 In Neuma, the plaintiff corporation ("Neuma") entered

108. Id.
109. In an unpublished opinion, a magistrate judge relied on Sprint to
recommend that a health benefit claim assigned to the plaintiff in a divorce
decree should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Harwood v. Unicare Life & Health Ins. Co., Civ. Act. No. SA09-CV-0845 OG (NN), 2010 WL 1641273 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2010).
110. Sprint Commc'ns, 554 U.S. at 302 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
111. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
112. Biomed Pharms., Inc. v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 2d 730
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Neuma, Inc. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 515 F. Supp. 2d 825, 84849 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Suntrust Bank v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1282,
1290-91 (E.D. Va. 2003). In some opinions the implication is at best tenuous,
arising only because the court failed to dismiss for lack of standing even
though a court has a duty to determine its jurisdiction. See Lance v. Coffman,
549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (explaining how "federal courts must determine that
they have jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits.").
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into an agreement-commonly referred to as a viatical settlement
agreement-under which a plan participant assigned his rights
under a life insurance plan sponsored by Wells Fargo in exchange
for a lump sum payment. 113 Under the agreement, Neuma would
pay the premiums and receive the death benefits as a plan
beneficiary when the participant died. 114 The participant's
coverage under the plan ended upon his termination of
employment," 5 but he had the right to convert to an individual
policy within thirty-one days after termination. 16
Before Neuma tendered payment to the participant, it
contacted Wells Fargo to inquire about the participant's
employment status.117 Wells Fargo confirmed the employment
status, but failed to mention the participant was scheduled to be
terminated in thirty days.118 When the participant terminated,
nobody informed Neuma and the coverage lapsed without any
possibility of a conversion. 1 9 After it learned of the employee's
termination, Neuma requested copies of plan documents.120 Wells
Fargo furnished Neuma with some disclosures, but Neuma
asserted Wells Fargo did not furnish all the disclosures required
by ERISA.121 Neuma filed a suit against Wells Fargo seeking
benefits pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), relief under § 502(a)(3),
22
and statutory penalties under §§ 502(a)(1)(A) and 502(c).1
The court first considered whether Neuma might have
adequate relief under § 502(a)(1)(B), which would render it
ineligible to bring a § 502(a)(3) claim.123 The court found that
Neuma was not a participant or beneficiary of the plan, and
dismissed the § 502(a)(1)(B) for lack of standing.124 Accordingly,
the § 502(a)(3) claim survived. The court dismissed the § 502(c)
claim, however, because Neuma was not a participant or
beneficiary and thus lacked standing for that claim.125 Curiously,
though, the court did not dismiss the § 502(a)(3) claim for lack of
standing. The court did not address this issue, but presumably the
113. Neuma, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 829.
114. Id. at 830.
115. Id. at 831.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 834.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 836-37.
120. Id. at 837-38.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 841-45; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(A), 1132(c).
123. Id. at 845-46.
124. Neuma, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 848.
125. See id. at 858 (ruling that Neuma was not a beneficiary, but providing
an example of how a third-party provider could potentially have standing as a
beneficiary, e.g., as a beneficiary of a life insurance plan); see also infra note
129.
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court knew Neuma did not have standing under § 502(a)(3) as a
participant or beneficiary. One possible explanation is the court
assumed Neuma had derivative standing as an assignee of the
§ 502(a)(3) claim. In this way, the court implied that an assignee
has standing to bring a claim under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA.
Varity provides an example of the type of claim that a medical
provider may not have Article III standing to pursue. 126 The
question is whether, if one of the employees in Varity had been
treated at a hospital and assigned her claim, the hospital would
have standing to seek the reinstatement of the employee into the
employer's old plan. It would seem that, even under Sprint's
generous theory of standing as an assignee, the court would not be
able to redress the injury in the litigation.127 Unlike in Sprint,
where a win by the operators would result in the carriers cutting a
check to the aggregators, in this hypothetical the hospital could
not receive payment in the litigation because § 502(a)(3) does not
authorize monetary relief. Instead, the employee would have to
receive a court order of reinstatement. Even then, the employee
would have to exhaust her administrative remedies under ERISA.
Only after those two steps were completed could the medical
provider be awarded cash payment in the litigation. It appears,
then, that the injury-either the failure of the hospital to receive
payment or the failure of the plan to pay-could not be redressed
in the litigation. Accordingly, an assignee of a Varity-type claim
may not have Article III standing to pursue the § 502(a)(3) claim.
An example of an assigned § 502(a)(3) claim that would likely
survive an Article III challenge would be a subrogation claim. It is
common for ERISA health plans-particularly those that are fully
insured-to assign to a third party the right to pursue a
subrogation claim on behalf of the plan. And like the operators in
Sprint, such assignees typically turn over the proceeds from the
litigation to the plan and receive a fee for their services (which
typically is bundled within a larger fee arrangement). This fact
pattern is almost identical to the fact pattern in Sprint, and thus a
§ 502(a)(3) subrogation claim is likely assignable for purposes of
the assignee's standing under Article III.
4.

Statutory Standing to Pursue ERISA Claims

The concept of statutory standing is distinct from Article III
standing. 128 In Sprint, the Court addressed whether an
126. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
127. It is also possible the provider would not be a real party in interest
under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
128. CGM, LLC v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 664 F.3d 46, 52 (4th Cir.
2011). An example of one distinction is that, procedurally, a motion to dismiss
for lack of Article III standing is filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Id. Dismissal for lack of standing under § 502(a) should be
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assignment confers Article III standing on the assignee; Sprint did
not, of course, consider standing under ERISA § 502(a).
The courts clearly hold that statutory standing under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)-(3) is limited to participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries,
and the Secretary of Labor. 129 Only a participant or beneficiary
has standing to bring a claim for benefits under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B). 130 ERISA § 502(a)(3) by its terms only authorizes
lawsuits by participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries. 131 Nowhere
does the text of ERISA authorize medical providers to bring a
claim under ERISA. Moreover, medical providers will rarely, if
ever, be considered a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary of a
plan. 132 Accordingly, to seek relief under ERISA, their only
recourse is to bring a claim as an assignee of a participant or
beneficiary.
5. Derivative Statutory Standing as an Assignee
Several courts of appeals have held that a medical service
provider may have derivative standing under § 502(a). Under the
doctrine of derivative standing, the assignee of an ERISA benefit
claim "stands in the shoes of his assignor, and, if the assignment is
pursued under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
129. See, e.g., Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1264-65 (9th
Cir. 1992) (noting that statutory standing is limited to participants,
beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and the Secretary of Labor).
130. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); Pascack Valley Hosp.
Inc. v. Local 464A UFCW Welfare Reimbursement Plan, 388 F.3d 393, 400 (3d
Cir. 2004) (citing FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3); see also Sonoco Prods. Co. v. Physicians Health
Plan, Inc., 338 F.3d 366, 372 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating "only parties entitled to
pursue an ERISA claim under § 502(a)(3) are 'participants,' 'beneficiaries,' and
'fiduciaries"').
132. Depending on the language of the plan and the surrounding
circumstances, it may be possible to argue that a medical provider is a
beneficiary of the plan. See ERISA § 3(8); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(8) (West 2008)
(defining the term "beneficiary"). For example, in OSF Healthcare System v.
Marcone Appliance Parts Co. Employee Benefit Plan, No. 1:11-cv-01202-JBMJAG, 2012 WL 264197 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2012), the court found that a medical
provider could have standing as an "appointed representative" of the
participant. In that case, the plan used the term "claimant," but did not define
that term. The plan did define the term "employee" and "dependent," and the
medical provider argued that the term "claimant" must mean something other
than the covered employee or his dependents." Id. The plan document
provided further that the plan would consider a claim for benefits from a
"properly designated representative." The medical provider argued that, as the
appointed representative, it was a "claimant," and that a "claimant" was a
beneficiary under the plan and thus a beneficiary with standing under ERISA.
See id. Using these arguments, the medical provider survived a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion to dismiss, but the court left open the possibility that the designation
of the medical provider as an "appointed representative" was an invalid
assignment that would deprive the medical provider of standing. Id.
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valid, has standing to assert whatever rights the assignor
possessed." 133 This raises two issues for purposes of ERISA claims.
The first issue is whether ERISA allows the assignment of
health care benefits. 134 "Almost every circuit to have considered
the question has held that a health care provider can assert a
claim under § 502(a) where a beneficiary or participant has
assigned to the provider that individual's right to benefits under
the plan."135 Misic was one of the earliest cases to recognize
standing as an assignee.
Dr. Misic performed dental services for the plan's
beneficiaries who would assign their benefits to him. The plan
provided that it would pay for eighty percent of the cost of the
beneficiaries' dental care. When Dr. Misic submitted his bills, the
plan paid less than eighty percent.
Dr. Misic sued the plan asserting both an ERISA claim as an
assignee and various state law tort claims. Both the Defendant
and the Department of Labor argued that only those parties
identified in ERISA § 502(a) have standing to bring an ERISA
claim. The court responded that this argument "mistakenly
treat[s] Dr. Misic as a suitor in his own right. Dr. Misic sues
derivatively, as [an] assignee of beneficiaries."136 Relying on
numerous non-ERISA cases holding that a valid assignment
confers standing on assignees, the court held that Dr. Misic had
standing to sue as an assignee.
The validity of an assignment is the second issue to be
considered in determining whether a medical provider has
derivative standing. One potential objection to derivative standing
to bring a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim is the claim is equitable and,
therefore, the assignment would not be valid. A § 502(a)(1)(B)
claim has been held to be equitable in the context of plaintiffs'
request for jury trials in ERISA cases. The Seventh Amendment 37
guarantees a jury trial for statutory actions that are "analogous to
common-law law causes of action ordinarily decided in English law
courts in the late 18th century, as opposed to those customarily
heard by courts of equity . . . ."18 In determining whether a
statutory action would have been tried in law or in equity, the
133. Misic v. Bldg. Serv. Emps. Health, 789 F.2d 1374, 1378 n.4 (9th Cir.
1986).
134. Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Med. & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1289
(5th Cir. 1988).
135. See Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Teamsters Local 272, 642 F.3d 321, 329 (2d
Cir. 2011) (quoting Pascack Valley, 388 F.3d at 400 n.7).
136. Misic, 789 F.2d at 1378.
137. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
138. Graham v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 589 F.3d 1345, 1355 (10th Cir.
2009); but cf. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204,
221 (2002) (Congress authorized an (a)(1)(B) claim "without reference to
whether the relief sought is legal or equitable").
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court looks to "both the nature of the statutory action and the
remedy sought. The more important factor is whether the remedy
sought is legal or equitable in nature." 139 Because a claim under
ERISA "is an action to enforce a trust," the courts have found them
to be equitable in nature. 140 This rationale applies to § 502(a)(1)(B)
claims as well as to § 502(a)(3) claims. 141 And because a
§ 502(a)(1)(B) claim is equitable, it could be argued that the claim
could not be validly assigned.
Even if a court were to address the issue, it could easily find
that a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim is assignable. Courts routinely refer to
ERISA plans as contracts under which parties are free to bargain
over assignability. 142 Under traditional principals of equity, the
right to receive compensation under a contract was assignable. 143
And given that almost every circuit has held that a medical
provider has standing to bring an assigned § 502(a)(1)(B) claim, 144
it seems unlikely any court would reverse its position based on a
finding that a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim is equitable.
It may be, however, that a § 502(a)(3) claim is not assignable.
Historically, there was no absolute prohibition against assigning
equitable claims.14 5 The test of assignability turned on whether the
action would survive the death of the injured party and pass to the
injured party's heirs or estate.14 6 In other words, generally, an
equitable claim that is personal, or specific to the person, would
not survive the injured party's hypothetical death and was thus
not assignable. 147 In contrast, equitable "claims for breach of
139. Graham, 589 F.3d at 1355.
140. Id. at 1356 (quoting Adams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d
1156, 1162 (10th Cir.1998)); see also Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110 (stating that
"ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law.").
141. De Pace v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 257 F. Supp. 2d 543, 573-74
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).
142. Physicians Multispecialty Grp. v. Health Care Plan of Horton Homes,
Inc., 371 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2004).
143. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY AS ADMINISTERED IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - FOR ALL THE STATES AND TO THE UNION OF
LEGAL AND REMEDIES UNDER THE REFORMED PROCEDURE 4 (Spencer W. ed.

5th ed. § 1275a 1941) (hereinafter Pomeroy).
144. See supra text accompanying note 132.
145. See POMEROY, supra note 143, at § 1277 ("Where the thing in action
assigned is an equitable demand ... the assignee must sue in his own name");
but see Monticello Bldg. Corp. v. Monticello Inv. Co., 330 Mo. 1128, 1142, 52
S.W.2d 545, 553 (Mo. 1932) (citing, inter alia, 3 POMEROY'S EQUITY § 1276 (2d
Ed.)) ("One may purchase a cause of action at law and enforce all legal rights
which go with it, but the right to appeal to the conscience of a court of equity
cannot be bought or sold").
146. POMEROY, supra note 143, at § 1275. Any heir who is a beneficiary of a
plan may have standing under ERISA in his or her individual capacity,
whether or not the decedent's claims survive.
147. Street Search Partners, L.P. v. Ricon Intern., L.L.C., C.A. No. 04C-09-
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fiduciary obligations and resultant unjust enrichment have been
held to survive." 148 Thus, some § 502(a)(3) claims may not be
assignable, but others may. If the claim is not assignable, an
argument could be made the assignment is not valid and the
purported assignee does not have derivative standing to pursue
the claim.
The issue of the validity of an assignment is determined
under federal law.149 Because ERISA does not address the matter,
courts may "look to state law for inspiration," provided the state
law is not inconsistent with ERISA.15o Looking to the law of New
York, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York ruled an assignment is valid if there is "a perfected
transaction between the assignor and assignee, intended by those
parties to vest in the assignee a present right in the things
assigned." 15 1 "An assignment of rights is distinguished from a
promise to perform in the future to the extent that it manifests the
assignor's intention to extinguish her claim to performance by the
obligor and consequently create a legal relationship between the
assignee and the obligor."152 In this regard, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit distinguished an assignment
that required the assignor to concur with how the claim would be
settled from an assignment of an ERISA claim that reserved to the
assignor the right to sue should the claim be denied.15 3 The former
was an invalid assignment, in part because the assignor retained
control over the settlement process.154 The retention of the right to
sue in the latter, the Fifth Circuit held, did not prevent a valid
assignment.155

Most courts considering the issue have held that an ERISA
claim is not assignable if the plan contains an anti-assignment
clause that unambiguously prohibits the assignment. 56 Courts
have found anti-assignment provisions that are "typical
'spendthrift' clauses to be ambiguous and therefore ineffective to
prevent a valid assignment.15 7 The Fifth Circuit's opinion in
191-PLA, 2006 WL 1313859, *3 (Del. Super. May 12, 2006).
148. Id.
149. Weisenthal v. United Health Care Ins. Co. of N.Y., Nos. 07 Civ. 1175
(LAP) and 07 Civ. 0945 (LAP), 2007 WL 4292039, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2007).
150. Id.
151. Id. at *5.
152. Id. (citation omitted).
153. Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Med. and Benefits Plan, 959 F.2d 569, 57274 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Hermann II").
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See generally Physicians Multispecialty Grp., 371 F.3d at 1295-96
(collecting cases); La. Health Serv. and Indem. Co. v. Rapides Healthcare Sys.,
461 F.3d 529, 537 (5th Cir. 2006) ("absent a statute to the contrary, an antiassignment provision in a plan is permissible under ERISA").
157. Hermann II, 959 F.2d at 569. According to the Fifth Circuit, a typical
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Hermann II could, moreover, be construed to hold that an antialienation clause is per se impermissible under ERISA.158 The
United States District for the Southern District of New York has
also suggested that a plan's complete bar to assignments would
"violate the purpose and spirit of an ERISA medical plan."159
An assignee generally cannot assign more than he owns.160
Because of this rule, the remedies available to a medical provider
who sues as an assignee of an ERISA claim are the same ERISA
remedies that are available to participants. Because those
remedies are limited, medical providers often choose to pursue
their state law claims. A common issue with those claims is
whether they are preempted by ERISA.
IV. ERISA DOES NOT PREEMPT MEDICAL PROVIDER STATE LAW

CLAIMS
Medical provider claims can be divided into three categories:
(1) ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) claims brought by the provider as an
assignee of a participant or beneficiary, (2) state law claims
brought by providers in their individual capacity, and (3) state law
claims brought pursuant to a service contract under which the
provider agrees to provide services to the plan's participants for
agreed-upon fees ("Provider Agreement Claims"). The courts have
also recognized hybrid claims when the complaint alleges a
violation of ERISA and a violation of a duty independent of
ERISA.
"spendthrift" clause prevents an assignment "only to unrelated, third-party
assignees-other than the health care provider of assigned benefits-such as
creditors who might attempt to obtain voluntary assignments to cover debts
having no nexus with the Plan or its benefits, or even involuntary alienations
such as attempting to garnish payments for plan benefits." See also Univ. of
Tenn. William F. Bowld Hosp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 724, 72931 (W.D. Tenn. 1996).
158. Herman II, 959 F.2d at 575. There, the court stated:
The anti-assignment clause should not be applicable, however, to an
assignee who, as here, is the provider of the very services which the plan
is maintained to furnish. Were we to conclude otherwise, health care
providers ... would be unable to recover ... unless [the participant]
were to sue [the plan] . . . and [the medical service provider] in turn sue
[the participant]. Such a result would be inequitable as [the
participant] ... would have no incentive to pursue payment and might
).
be reluctant to sue the plan maintained by his own employer..
159. Protocare of Metro. N.Y., Inc. v. Mutual Ass'n Adm'rs, Inc., 866 F.
Supp. 757, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Ne. Dep't ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v.
Teamsters Local No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 154 n. 6 (3d Cir. 1985).
160. See Scott v. Durham, 772 F. Supp. 2d 978, 980 (N.D. Ind. 2011)
(explaining that "a valid assignment gives the assignee neither greater nor
lesser rights than those held by the assignor"); but cf. Beckley Capital Ltd.
P'ship v. DiGeronimo, 184 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 1999) ("sometimes an assignee,"
such as a good faith purchaser for value, "may get more than the assignor").
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A. Courts DistinguishActions Brought as Assignee from Those
Brought Individually
In The Meadows v. Employees Health Insurance,16 1 the
Meadows, a substance abuse treatment facility, treated a
participant covered by an ERISA health plan in 1990. For two
different treatments, the Meadows received oral verification of
coverage in a telephone call with the insurer. For one of those
treatments the insurer furnished the Meadows a written
verification. Later, the insurer denied the claim because the
participant's plan coverage had terminated in 1989.162
The Meadows sued the insurer in Arizona state court for
negligent misrepresentations, estoppel, and breach of contract; the
insurer removed the case to federal court.163 The district court
found that because the Meadows sued as an assignee, its state law
claims were preempted and dismissed the case without
prejudice. 164
The following year, the Meadows filed a second complaint in
Arizona state court realleging the same three counts. "This time,
however, the Meadows did not assert any claims as the assignee"
of the plan participant. 165 Instead, the Meadows sued only as a
third-party health care provider for claims that were nonderivative and independent of those which the [participant] might
have had."166 The issue before the Court of Appeals was "whether
ERISA preempts claims by a third party who sues an ERISA plan
not as an assignee of a purported beneficiary, but as an
16 7
independent entity claiming damages."
The Ninth Circuit held the claims were not preempted. It
reasoned that in 1990, at the time of the treatment and the
misrepresentations by the insurer, neither the participant nor the
Meadows had "any existing ties" to any ERISA plan. 168 As a result,
the state law claims did not relate to any plan, and were therefore
not preempted by ERISA.

In Franciscan Skemp Healthcare,Inc. v. Central States Joint
Board Health and Welfare,169 the Central States Joint Board
Health and Welfare Trust Fund ("Central States") neglected to
inform a health care provider-who telephoned to verify
coverage-that the participant could lose her coverage

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

The Meadows v. Emp'rs Health Ins., 47 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1007-09.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1008.

166. Id.
167. Id. (emphasis in original).
168. Id. at 1009.
169. Franciscan Skemp Healthcare Inc. v. Cent. States Joint Bd. Health,
538 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2008).
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retroactively if she failed to pay her COBRA premiums. 170 When
Central States denied the claim because the participant was not
covered, the provider brought an action in state court alleging
state law claims of negligent misrepresentation and estoppel.
Central States removed to federal court and argued the state law
claims were completely preempted by ERISA.171
The Seventh Circuit relied on Davila to analyze whether the
claims were completely preempted. 172 Central States first argued
that Franciscan-Skemp, the health care provider, had received an
assignment from the participant and could therefore have
derivative standing to bring a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim. The Court of
Appeals found, however, that Franciscan-Skemp brought the
claims not as an assignee, but entirely in its own right, because
the claims arose not from the plan's terms, but from the oral
misrepresentations of Central States.173
The court also found that the oral representations that
supported the state law claims gave rise to an independent legal
duty.174 In doing so, the court looked to the elements of negligent
misrepresentation under Wisconsin law and concluded that the
legal duties implicated by Wisconsin law were entirely
independent from ERISA and any plan terms.175 FranciscanSkemp is in line with several cases from other circuits. 76
One of the more recent cases to emerge on this issue is Access
Mediquip v. UnitedHealthcareInsurance Co.1 77 Access Mediquip
involved a medical device supplier, Access, which procured medical
devices for medical service providers. The service providers used
the medical devices in procedures performed on individuals
covered by an ERISA health plan. Before procuring the device,
170. Id. at 595-96: COBRA is an acronym that stands for the "Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985." Under COBRA, a participant
who loses coverage under a health plan upon a termination of employment
may elect to continue that coverage for a certain period. The participant can be
required to pay the premiums due, which are commonly referred to as
"COBRA premiums." COBRA coverage can, under certain circumstances, be
cancelled retroactively for a failure to pay the COBRA premiums. See
generally I.R.C. § 4980B(f) and Treas. Reg. § 54.4980B-1 et. seq.
171. FranciscanSkemp, 538 F.3d at 596.
172. Id. at 596.
173. Id. at 597.
174. Id. at 599.
175. Id. at 598-99.
176. See Home Health, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 101 F.3d 600, 60407 (8th Cir. 1996); Hospice of Metro Denver v. Grp. Health Ins. of Okla., Inc.,
944 F.2d 752 (10th Cir. 1991); Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co.,
904 F.2d 236, 243-50 (5th Cir. 1990); Lordmann Enters., Inc. v. Equicor, Inc.,
32 F.3d 1529 (11th Cir. 1994).
177. Access Medquip LLC v. UnitedHealthCare Ins. Co., 662 F.3d 376 (5th
Cir. 2011).
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Access would contact UnitedHealthcare to verify that the cost of
the device would be reimbursed. UnitedHealthcare orally
represented that the costs would in fact be covered. When later the
claims were denied, Access sued asserting state law claims of
promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, and claims
brought under the Texas Insurance Code. 78
The Fifth Circuit held that the state law claims were not
completely preempted by ERISA.179 In so holding, it relied on its

prior opinion in Memorial Hospital System v. Northbrook Life
Insurance Co.:18 0
A defendant pleading preemption under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) must
prove that: "(1) the state law claims address an area of exclusive
federal concern, such as the right to receive benefits under the terms
of an ERISA plan; and (2) the claims directly affect the relationships
among traditional ERISA entities-the employer, the plan and its
fiduciaries,and the participantsand beneficiaries."181

The second prong of this test-that the claims affect the
relationships among traditional ERISA entities-distinguishes a
state law claim brought by a medical provider, which is not
preempted, and a similar state law claim brought by a participant,
which is preempted. This distinction was highlighted more clearly
in the unpublished opinion of Werner v. Group Health Plan, Inc.182
Werner's wife was pre-certified for a costly medical
procedure. 88
Defendant Group Health
("Group Health")
repeatedly assured Werner that no premiums were due in
connection with his plan. 184 Werner and his wife relied on these
assurances, and she underwent the procedure. Later, the
Defendant cancelled the coverage, requested repayment for the
bills previously paid, and refused to pay any outstanding claims or
negotiate or settle them.18 5 Werner sued in state court alleging
various state law claims, including promissory estoppel and
negligent misrepresentation.186 Group Health removed the case to
federal court and asserted the claims were completely preempted
by ERISA.187

Werner argued the claims were not completely preempted,

178. Id. at 378-81.
179. Id. at 383-84.
180. Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.
1990).
181. Access, 662 F.3d at 382 (quoting Mem'l Hosp., 904 F.2d at 245).
182. Werner v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., No. 09-cv-891-JPG, 2010 WL
1640437 (S.D. Ill. April 20, 2010).

183. Id. at *1.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
Id.

187. Id.
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relying on Franciscan-Skemp.188 The court distinguished
Franciscan-Skemp because in that case the claims were brought
by a healthcare provider, whereas the Werners' claims were
brought as a plan participant or beneficiary.1 89 The court went on
to declare flatly: "[p]ut simply, since the instant action is brought
by Werner, not his wife's healthcare provider, a different set of
legal principles is at play." 19 0 This different set of legal principles
includes ERISA's limited remedies and the preemption of state
law by § 514 of ERISA. Yet, nothing in the text of § 514 expressly
requires that the identity of the plaintiff would lead to a different
result, where the medical provider, but not the participant, has
the right under state law to enforce its agreement with the plan
(or employer).
1. ProviderAgreement Claims
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
analyzed Provider Agreement claims in Blue Cross of California v.
Anesthesia Care Associates Medical Group, Inc.191 In Anesthesia
Care, the court held that claims for breach of the provider
agreements were not completely preempted, even though the
providers obtained an assignment of benefit claims from
participants in an ERISA plan. Relying on Misic to argue the
claim was preempted, Blue Cross asserted the provider's right to
payment under the agreement was, at least with respect to the
ERISA participants, effectively a claim for benefits based on the
assignment.192 The court found that Misic was not controlling. 193
Dr. Misic had no agreement and thus could recover payment only
pursuant to the plan's terms.194 In contrast, Blue Cross entered
into separate agreement with the providers. 195 Because the
provider was seeking payment under those separate agreements,
the court distinguished between the right to payment, which could
depend on the validity of the assignments, and the amount or level
of payment that is measured by reference to the Provider
Agreement.196

Blue Cross also argued that the Provider Agreement claims
were preempted because they affected relationships governed by

188. Id. at *4.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Blue Cross of Cal. v. Anesthesia Care Assocs. Med. Grp., Inc., 187 F.3d
1045 (9th Cir. 1999).
192. Id. at 1050.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1051.
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ERISA.19 7 In General American Life Insurance Co. v. Castonguay,
the Ninth Circuit declared:
The key to distinguishing between what ERISA preempts and what
it does not lies . . . in recognizing that the statute comprehensively
regulates certain relationships: for instance, the relationship
between plan and plan member, between plan and employer,
between employer and employee (to the extent an employee benefit
plan is involved), and between plan and trustee. Because of ERISA's
explicit language and because state laws regulating these
relationships (or the obligations flowing from these relationships)
are particularly likely to interfere with ERISA's scheme, these laws
are presumptively preempted. 198
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument by Blue Cross as well,
finding that its payments under the Provider Agreements would
not affect its status as an ERISA fiduciary or any participant's
claims for benefits.19 9
2. Hybrid Claims
In Connecticut State Dental Association v. Anthem Health
Plans, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit analyzed whether a complaint
that combined assertions of improper claim denials with
allegations of wrongful payments under a Provider Agreement was
completely preempted. 200 The plaintiffs alleged that Anthem
Health Plans, Inc. ("Anthem") used improper payment methods
under the guise of utilization review in order to pay less than was
allegedly due under the Provider Agreement. 20 1 The court
reviewed the complaint carefully and noted that the plaintiffs also
alleged Anthem had improperly denied participant claims. 202 The
court framed this combination as a hybrid claim "part of which is
within § 502(a) and part of which is beyond the scope of ERISA."203
For the providers to bring ERISA claims, the court held, they must
have derivative standing as an assignee. 204 Thus, unlike in
Anesthesia Care, where the assignments were not relevant, the
existence of the assignments was relevant in Connecticut State
Dental.205

197. Id. at 1053-54.
198. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Castonguay, 984 F.2d 1518, 1521 (9th Cir.

1993) (internal citations omitted).
199. Anesthesia Care, 187 F.3d at 1053.

200.

Conn. State Dental Assoc. v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 591 F.3d 1337

(11th Cir. 2009).

201. Id. at 1342-43.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1351.
Id.
Id.
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Summary
Connecticut State Dental provides a good summary "regarding

complete preemption of medical service provider claims." 206 First,
medical service providers are usually not completely preempted 207
and are not usually subject to ERISA's defensive preemption. 208
"For example, a healthcare provider's claims of negligent
misrepresentation and estoppel based on a plan's oral
misrepresentations are not ERISA claims because they do not
arise from the plan or its terms." 209 Second, the court notes it is
well established that providers may obtain derivative standing via
an assignment and the corresponding claim falls within the scope
of ERISA § 502(a). 210 Third, a provider that has both an assigned
claim and an independent claim can assert the assigned ERISA
claim, the independent claim, or both.211
V. CONCLUSION
The courts' analysis of medical provider state law claims
against plans and employers for broken promises, misstatements,
and misrepresentations contrasts sharply with how the courts
handle almost identical claims raised by ERISA claimants. In
seeking relief, medical providers have a significant advantage over
plan participants. They can bring state law claims, ERISA claims,
or both. Thus, depending on state law and the nature of the claim,
they might be allowed to seek extra-contractual damages, punitive
damages, and attorneys' fees, as well as any remedies that are
available under ERISA, however limited they may be. Moreover,
under their state law claims, medical providers would not be
subjected to the deferential review by the court that upholds a
plan fiduciary's denial so long as the fiduciary does not abuse its
discretion.
Turning back to the hypothetical, the hospital's state law
claim based on the employer's promise to the hospital to pay for
the executive's operation would not be preempted. However,
because the hospital never spoke with the employer about the
husband's operation, it could only bring a claim under ERISA as
an assignee. The § 502(a)(1)(B) claim would fail, because the
benefit would not be due under the terms of the plan and the
standard rule that oral promises cannot modify a plan's terms

206.
207.
(11th
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 1346.
Id. (citing Hobbs v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala., 276 F.3d 1236, 1241
Cir. 2001)).
Id. at 1344 n.7 (citing Lordmann Enters., 32 F.3d at 1533).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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would likely prevail. Even if the hospital or the husband were to
file a § 502(a)(3) claim, unless Amara were to make a difference, it
too would likely fail because of ERISA's limited remedies.
Congress adopted ERISA for the express purpose of protecting
the interests of participants and benefits in employee benefits
plans. 212 Yet arguably participants are worse off now than they
were before Congress enacted ERISA.213 Under ERISA's scheme of
preemption and limited remedies, employers are released from
their promises and employees are left to pay for employers'
mistakes. 214 The most frequently cited rationale for this is to
encourage the formation of employee benefit plans. 215 It would
seem this rationale should apply with equal force whether the
claim is brought by a participant or a medical provider.
effective
The existing case law also discourages
communications between plans and medical providers. Any
misstatement by a plan to a medical provider could be actionable,
depending on the appropriate state law standards that govern
misrepresentations. Under ERISA, the misstatement would
generally have to rise to the level of a breach of fiduciary duties to
be actionable. Under Frahm, the fiduciary breach may have to be
as egregious as the deceptive behavior described in Varity.
Moreover, as a general rule, ERISA's fiduciary standard of care
looks more to the process and less to the result. Thus, by imposing
a higher standard of care on plan fiduciaries, Congress has
insulated plans from the consequences of their poor results. In
contrast, because ERISA does not regulate the relationship
between plans and medical providers-in other words, because
ERISA does not impose a higher standard of care on plans vis-Avis medical providers-plans can be held liable for their poor
results if they affect medical providers. It seems odd that a higher
standard of care results in less exposure to liability. The difference
in exposure will depend, of course, on how the standard of care
required under applicable state law-such as the common law
governing negligent misrepresentations or the statutory
requirements under a deceptive trade practices act-compares to
ERISA's fiduciary standard of care, and how the remedies that are
available under applicable state law compare to ERISA's remedies.
Whether plans should be held liable to participants for
something less than a fiduciary breach, and whether they should
be protected from liability for "slipups" that are merely "bad advice

212. ERISA § 2(b); 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
213. Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Stumpff, supra note
73.
214. Young v. Verizon's Bell Atl. Cash Balance Plan, 615 F.3d 808, 812 (7th
Cir. 2010) ("People make mistakes. Even administrators of ERISA plans").
215. Graham v. Balcor Co., 1046 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998).
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delivered verbally,"216 is for Congress and, where the claim is not
preempted (or should Congress exit the field), the states to decide.
Amara may offer relief to ERISA claimants who, in the future, rely
on a plan's misstatements. But then again, it may not.

216.

Frahm, 137 F.3d at 959-61.

